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Abstract
I argue that it is possible to give an interpretation of the classical ~ → 0 limit of
quantum mechanics that results in a partial explanation of the success of classical me-
chanics. The interpretation is novel in that it allows one to explain the success of the
theoretical structure of classical mechanics. This interpretation clarifies the relation-
ship between physical quantities and propositions in quantum theories, and provides a
precise notion of a quantum theory holding “approximately on certain scales”.
1 Introduction
The purpose of this paper is to show a precise sense in which quantum mechanics can explain
the success of classical mechanics through the classical ~ → 0 limit. This work is a con-
tribution to a tradition of philosophical investigations of the classical limit stemming from
Post (1971) and continuing through Scheibe (1986), Rohrlich (1990), Radder (1991), and
Primas (1998). A central question in these investigations is whether one can use quantum
mechanics to explain, not only why the predictions of classical mechanics are nearly accurate
in many systems, but also why the theoretical structure of classical mechanics is successful
in generating predictions and explanations of phenomena. The contribution of the current
investigation is to show that one can produce an explanation of the theoretical structure of
classical mechanics from quantum mechanics through the classical limit. The explanation
proceeds by showing that the theoretical properties and relations of physical magnitudes
as represented in quantum mechanics can always be understood as “close” to the theoret-
ical properties and relations as represented in classical mechanics. I aim to show that the
classical ~ → 0 limit makes the notion of “closeness” precise. What it means for physical
magnitudes to be “close” is that their difference lies within an error bound determined by
both a numerical value and a system of units in which that numerical value is expressed.
The system of units in turn is encoded as a choice of numerical value for Planck’s constant
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~, understood as the same physical parameter in different units, on the way to the limit.
Although changing units (as ~ → 0) does not affect either the phenomena being modeled
or the theory used to model it, it can encode larger error bounds in which quantum and
classical mechanics become “close”.
This notion of “closeness” or “approximation” is already employed in mathematical
physics, and I believe it is implicit in discussions in the broader physics community. It
is worth making this interpretation explicit, however, because the notion of “closeness” is
considerably stronger than that recognized in most conceptual discussions. My analysis en-
tails that the predictions given by quantum mechanics for expectation values in each state
are “close” to the corresponding predictions in classical physics. But it also provides much
more: (i) the error bound by which the predictions of quantum and classical mechanics are
allowed to differ can be made uniform for all possible states, and (ii) the properties and
relations encoded in the algebraic structure of quantum mechanics can be shown to be close
to the properties and relations encoded in the algebraic structure of classical mechanics.
I believe the significance of the ~ → 0 limit goes beyond establishing the relationship
between quantum and classical mechanics. Through this investigation, we can clarify our
interpretation of quantities, propositions and other theoretical structure in quantum theories.
Further, I believe an interpretation of the classical limit is important for understanding its
role in the stage of heuristics, or theory construction. And finally, I hope it will become
clear that the notion of “approximation on certain scales” I develop is not unique to the
classical limit; this concept appears elsewhere in quantum physics. For example, I believe
the interpretation developed here has implications for our understanding of renormalization
in quantum field theories, where one also speaks of “approximation on certain scales”. These
last two topics of heuristics and renormalization go beyond the present work and I will not
discuss them further, but these potential applications show that the current topic can lay
the groundwork for future investigations.
The structure of the paper is as follows. In §2, I review the perspectives of other authors
on the explanatory status of the classical limit. I show how the old question of whether the
classical limit allows one to explain the theoretical structure of classical mechanics arises
again in the context of work by contemporary authors. In §3, I lay out mathematical tools
that for understanding the classical limit of quantum theories in terms of continuous fields
of algebras, which gives rise to the theory of strict deformation quantization. I then use
these mathematical tools in §4 to make precise how one can explain through the classical
limit why quantum systems behave approximately classically when probed on certain scales.
Finally, I conclude in §5 with some discussion.
2 Background
This section situates the position developed in this paper within the contemporary literature
on the classical limit, primarily in response to recent work by Rosaler (2015b,a, 2016, 2018).
I show that Rosaler’s interpretation of the classical limit lacks important features, which I
hope to be able to recover in the following sections. In particular, Rosaler is only able to
explain the success of the empirical predictions of classical mechanics, but not its theoretical
structure. This issue is, of course, much older—dating from at least the work of Post (1971)
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and Radder (1991). It is the central concern of this paper to show that one can explain the
theoretical structure of classical mechanics from quantum mechanics, and so it will be helpful
to establish that this is a live issue even though it has not been the focus of contemporary
discussions.
Rosaler frames his contribution as a response to Batterman (1991, 2002), who argues
that quantum mechanics fails to explain the success of classical mechanics because of the
“singular” nature of the ~ → 0 limit. For example, Batterman (2002) constructs a family
of quantum states (in the form of wavefunctions) from the data of a classical theory. These
wavefunctions take the form ψ(q) ∼ e i~S(q,P ), where S is a real-valued function. Batterman
claims that since these functions fail to converge in the limit as ~→ 0, the classical limit is
“singular”. This feature shows, according to Batterman, that one must pay careful attention
to deviations from classical behavior in the ~→ 0 limit, which he refers to as semi-classical
physics. These non-classical deviations, Batterman argues, prevent the reduction of classical
to quantum mechanics:
My discussion of these borderland phenomena and their explanation should also
lead one to question what has become a fairly common sentiment among physi-
cists and philosophers. It seems that most investigators maintain a reductionist
and even eliminativist attitude toward classical physics given the many successes
of the quantum theory. Of course, it is just this attitude that I have been at
pains to question. (Batterman, 2002, p. 111)
While I completely agree with Batterman that the semi-classical phenomena he points to—
especially those concerning chaotic systems—are important and interesting, I am not con-
vinced that they prevent us from providing a (partial) reduction. In particular, I do not think
Batterman’s claims extend to all instances of the ~→ 0 limit. Perhaps Batterman is correct
that a reductive explanation of all aspects of chaotic classical systems is impossible. But I
believe that for some systems, it is possible to give a reductive explanation of the success
of at least the kinematical structure of classical mechanics from the kinematical structure of
quantum mechanics, and I will attempt to establish this in what follows.
Rosaler and I appear to agree about the possibility of giving a kind of reductive expla-
nation of classical behavior, but our proposed explanations differ radically. The explanation
I will offer of classical behavior follows Batterman’s approach at least in the sense that I
employ the ~ → 0 limit. Here, I follow an idea of Nickles (1975) (which Batterman also
cites) that these limiting relations might provide “approximative reductions”:
Approximative reductions [...] might be said to explain why the predecessor
theory worked as well as it did [...] (Nickles, 1975, p. 185, fn. 4)
It is precisely this kind of explanation that I will take the classical limit to offer. I believe
one can use the classical limit to explain why classical mechanics works as well as it did. In
contrast, Rosaler leaves behind the classical ~→ 0 limit altogether, instead giving an alter-
native explanation of the success of classical mechanics through decoherence theory. I want
to highlight two of the reasons he provides for this approach, which I believe to be ill-founded.
(i) First, Rosaler claims there are difficulties interpreting the ~ → 0 limit because ~ is a
physical constant that takes on a single value:
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One may make the predictable criticism that Batterman’s analysis relies on the
limit ~→ 0 even though ~ is constant for all real systems, and that the relevance
of the analysis for real systems is obscured by this fact. (Rosaler, 2015a, p. 331)
Rosaler seems to believe that these difficulties can be dealt with, but only by making matters
more complicated. The common strategy that he points to is outlined already by Batterman:
One might reasonably wonder what it could mean to let a constant change its
value. The way to understand “~ → 0” is that it is the limit in which ~ is
small relative to some quantity having the same dimension—namely, the classical
action. (Batterman, 2002, p. 99, fn. 1)
However, Rosaler notes, we commonly analyze the behavior of quantum systems as ~ varies
without attention to the ratio between ~ and the classical action. Rosaler asserts that this
“may be seen as a matter of convenience, [but] it is a convenience that comes at a significant
cost to our physical insight” (Rosaler, 2015a, p. 331). According to him, if we do not
explicitly treat the classical limit in terms of ratios of ~ to classical action, we will not have
complete understanding of the intertheory relations between quantum and classical physics.
There seems to be an implicit assumption in Rosaler’s argument here that the only way
one might make sense of the ~ → 0 limit is to employ the strategy of using ~ as proxy for
a dimensionless ratio. Rosaler is not alone on this point; the statement that the constant ~
cannot vary echoes Nickles and Radder:
Indeed, it makes no physical sense to permit physical constants to vary (~→ 0,
c→∞). (Nickles, 1975, p. 201)
Of course, from a physical point of view putting h = 0 is impossible: h is an
empirically fixed constant unequal to zero[.] (Radder, 1991, p. 209, fn. 8)
Although none of these authors elaborate on this impossibility, the reason seems to be that
the alternative forces us to imagine different possible worlds in which ~ really takes a different
value and the physics of such worlds differs from our own. I think one might reasonably worry,
if this were the alternative, about how one could use facts about these other possible worlds
in which ~ differs to explain anything about our own world.
Fortunately, I don’t believe this is the only alternative. I hope to show that it is possible
for one to interpret the ~→ 0 limit as representing features of our own world without think-
ing of ~ as proxy for a dimensionless ratio. This is not to say that I reject the dimensionless
ratio interpretation; I think such an interpretation works together with the one I will present,
and so I will return to their relationship briefly in §5.
(ii) Second, Rosaler claims that philosophers who analyze only mathematical relations be-
tween theories (like the ~→ 0 limit) miss important empirical content:
While questions about empirical reduction are partially mathematical in nature,
assessing whether one theory reduces empirically to another requires further em-
pirical input regarding the set of circumstances under which the reduced the-
ory furnishes an accurate representation of the behavior of some actual physical
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system; without such information, it would not generally be possible to assess
whether one theory encompasses the domain in which the other is successful.
(Rosaler, 2015a, p. 338)
Rosaler’s preferred notion of empirical reduction is described as follows:
Empirical reduction requires that every circumstance under which the behavior
of a real physical system can be modeled in the reduced theory (in this case,
classical mechanics) is also one in which that same behavior can be modeled at
least as precisely in the reducing theory (in this case, quantum mechanics). That
is, empirical reduction requires that the reducing theory wholly subsume the
physical domain of applicability of the reduced theory, but does not necessarily
require the reduced theory’s formal mathematical structure to be subsumed as
a special or limiting case of the reducing theory’s formal structure. (Rosaler,
2015a, p. 326)
Here, I agree with Rosaler that extra empirical information is necessary to know the
situations in which a reduced theory is successful. But I believe his statements here go too
far toward what Nagel called an “instrumentalist” approach, according to which
[t]he claim that a theory T [...] is reduced to another theory T ′ [is] that all the
observation statements which can be derived from given data with the help of
T can also be derived with the help of T ′, but not conversely. Accordingly, the
question to which this account of [...] reduction is addressed is not the ostensibly
asserted content of the theories involved in reduction, but the comparative ranges
of observable phenomena to which two theories are applicable. (Nagel, 1998, p.
911)
Nagel believed the instrumentalist approach was inadequate. He writes,
[...I]t ignores the question of how, if at all, the concepts of a reduced theory are
related to those of the reducing one, or in what way statements about a variety
of observable things may fall within the scope of both theories. (Nagel, 1998, p.
912)
Another way of putting the point is that if one only shows that the reducing theory can make
all of the correct empirical predictions about the domain of the reduced theory, then one has
not given an adequate explanation of why the theoretical structure of the reduced theory was
successful. In the case at hand, we have a genuine explanatory task to say why the theoretical
apparatus of classical Hamiltonian phase spaces with Poisson brackets is successful when the
quantum theory does not employ those mathematical tools.
This issue of whether one can give an explanation of the theoretical structure of classical
mechanics from quantum mechanics has been prominent in the literature. For example,
Post formulates the requirement of reductive explanations as the “General Correspondence
Principle”:
...the principle claims far more than mere ‘agreement’ on individual instances
of factual data found to be successfully covered by the [reduced theory]. The
5
General Correspondence Principle claims that the [reducing theory] inherits a
coherent pattern of theorems, including some higher levels, from the [reduced
theory]. (Post, 1971, p. 235)
On the other hand, we see a contrasting view from Radder, who claims that the classical
limit does not explain the theoretical structure of classical mechanics:
In surveying the whole episode in the history of 20th century physics we may
conclude that, ultimately, the success of the correspondence principle appears
not to rest upon a conceptual correspondence but rather upon a combination of
numerical and formal correspondence. (Radder, 1991, p. 208)
Such a formal correspondence between mathematical equations is by itself insuf-
ficient [...] the formally corresponding terms or quantities need to have the same
experimentally obtainable values in (the neighborhood of) that limit. (Radder,
1991, p. 212)
The basic problem is that classical observables are mathematically represented by
functions (on a phase space of generalized coordinates), while quantum observ-
ables are represented by operators (on a Hilbert space of state vectors). (Radder,
1991, p. 219)
My goal in the remainder of the paper is to show that in the case at hand, one can explain
the theoretical structure of classical mechanics from quantum mechanics. The explanation I
provide will yield exactly what Radder seems to desire and yet asserts is not available.
In fact, I think the explanation Rosaler gives also goes beyond what an instrumentalist
would hope for, but it is worth being clear about the explanandum at the outset. In what
follows, I aim to provide an explanation of why the kinematical structure of classical mechan-
ics is successful. I will show how classical physics arises as an approximation (and so I go
beyond the instrumentalist), and yet my explanation will also satisfy Rosaler’s desideratum
by allowing empirical information concerning allowable errors to play a role in explaining
when classical mechanics is accurate.
In order to lead us into my positive account of the explanation of classical behavior, I
believe it is helpful to pinpoint exactly where in Rosaler’s analysis this issue arises. Ulti-
mately, Rosaler’s association of quantum states with classical states proceeds by identifying
a quantum state with the classical state whose definite values for the classical position and
momentum quantities are equal to the expectation values for the quantum position and mo-
mentum operators. Rosaler’s justification for this is the assumption that “some mechanism
for collapse or effective collapse” (Rosaler, 2015a, p. 335) will allow us to model a quantum
superposition by considering just one component along one of its branches.1 Rosaler is ap-
propriately agnostic about what this mechanism for collapse might be. However, I do not
think this dispels the worry.
Suppose, as Rosaler does, that there is some collapse-like mechanism that leads to well-
localized wave-functions along branches defined by particular coherent “pointer” states. Even
1See also Rohrlich (1990, p. 1410), who claims that the measurement problem prevents a reductive
explanation. Rosaler and I agree that a solution to the measurement problem is not needed for at least the
outlines of a reductive explanation.
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so, there is still a question of why one is justified in employing classical concepts to describe
these quantum states at all—for example, the notion of a determinate value and a definite
trajectory. It is not clear why one should take the expectation values of physical quantities
in a quantum state, which do not represent determinate values of those physical quantities
in general, and think of them as determinate states in a classical phase space with the
structure of a manifold. And furthermore, it is not clear why one can think of the quantum
position and momentum operators as corresponding to classical quantities of position and
momentum, which are functions on a phase space with Poisson structure. Why can one
successfully employ the kinematical framework of classical mechanics to represent a system
whose quantum description is in terms of an entirely different kinematical framework?
Rosaler’s analysis using decoherence theory is illuminating, and I believe it is compatible
in many ways with what I will say in the rest of this paper. I only aim to fill this gap—which
is small but conceptually important—in our explanation of classical behavior from quantum
mechanics. The next section (§3) reviews the mathematical tools necessary for my analysis,
and then §4 uses an interpretation of these tools to present an explanation of the success of
classical kinematics from quantum mechanics.
3 The classical limit
Although historically the term “quantization” has been reserved for the process of con-
structing a quantum theory, modern mathematical theories of deformation quantization are
understood instead to provide tools for the “inverse” or “dual” process of taking the classi-
cal limit (Rieffel, 1989, 1993, 1994; Landsman, 1998, 2006, 2017).2 This is accomplished by
constructing a family of algebras, each representing a quantum theory of the same “form”
(i.e., with the capacity to represent the same physical systems), but with a different value
for Planck’s constant ~. As I will attempt to make precise later, each of these algebras can
be thought of as representing the same system in a different system of units. One provides
additional structure to “glue” these algebras together into a continuous field, which allows
one to specify continuous limits of states and quantities in the limit as ~ → 0. There are
other limits one might also analyze to recover classical behavior (e.g., the limit N → ∞ of
increasing number of particles), but I will focus on the ~→ 0 limit here.
How is the ~ → 0 limit supposed to explain classical behavior? Imagine starting with
a fully quantum theory in which Planck’s constant takes the value ~ = 1 in natural units.
Next, “zoom out” from the quantum description, and look at larger and larger scales, let-
ting Planck’s constant get smaller and smaller until ~ ≈ 0. The theory one obtains is an
approximate classical description of the same system on the appropriate scales.
This is a nice outline, but given the skepticism of Rosaler and others, we should admit
that there are missing pieces. What does it mean to have the same theory of a physical
system but “zoom out”? What exactly is a “scale” in this context, and how is it related
to a value for ~? What is the notion of approximation involved, and how does the ~ → 0
limit capture this process in a way that has explanatory force? It is my goal in §4 to answer
2The role of the classical limit in theory construction, or heuristics, is a further significant philosophical
issue, as can be seen from the discussions in Post (1971) and Radder (1991).
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these questions. In order to do so, I will need to use some details of the mathematical tools
surrounding deformation quantization, which I now present in this section.
3.1 Continuous fields of C*-algebras
In this section, I describe the mathematical tools used to represent the classical limit. I
take a quantum theory to be given by a (non-commutative) C*-algebra3 representing the
bounded physical quantities of a system including perhaps generalized position and momen-
tum quantities that satisfy some canonical (anti-)commutation relations (See Petz, 1990;
Clifton and Halvorson, 2001; Ruetsche, 2011). Physicists and philosophers have debated4
whether C*-algebras are an appropriate starting point for quantum theories or whether we
need the additional structure of a Hilbert space representation. I will ignore these debates
in what follows and simply assume that we start with a C*-algebra for a quantum theory;
this should be uncontroversial because all parties to these debates agree that we require at
least the structure of a C*-algebra (especially for the finite systems considered here).
A C*-algebra already carries enough structure to define a number of topologies (e.g.,
norm, weak, etc.) that provide different notions of the limit of a net of physical quantities
within an algebra (See Feintzeig, 2018c). However, to understand the classical limit, one
requires resources for taking the limit of a family of algebras, where each algebra is under-
stood to represent a full quantum theory. Such tools are provided in the theory of strict
deformation quantization.
In a strict deformation quantization, one has a family of algebras Ah for each possible
numerical value h ∈ [0, 1] of Planck’s constant ~. The algebra A0 at the value h = 0
will represent a classical theory; so one requires that A0 contains as a norm dense subset
a (complex) Poisson algebra (P , {·, ·}). This Poisson algebra arises from a Hamiltonian
formulation of a classical theory, where the elements of P are smooth functions on a phase
space with the structure of a Poisson manifold, and hence can be thought of as physical
magnitudes (Landsman, 1998). On the other hand, each algebra Ah for h 6= 0 will be a
non-commutative algebra representing a quantum theory.
The core idea of taking the limit of a collection of C*-algebras is to gather them into a
structure known as a continuous field of algebras.
Definition 1. A continuous field of C*-algebras5 ((Ah)h∈[0,1],K) consists in a family of C*-
algebras Ah for each value of h ∈ [0, 1] and a C*-subalgebra K of
∏
h∈[0,1]Ah (i.e., each
element K ∈ K is a map that sends each value h ∈ [0, 1] to an element of Ah). For each
h ∈ [0, 1], the set {K(h) | K ∈ K} must be ‖·‖h-dense in Ah, where ‖·‖h is the C*-norm on
Ah. Furthermore, K must satisfy:
1. For each K ∈ K, the map h 7→ ‖K(h)‖h is continuous. The elements of K are called
continuous sections of the field.
2. For each K ∈ K, the norm in K is given by ‖K‖ = suph∈[0,1]‖K(h)‖h.
3I assume familiarity with the theory of C*-algebras in this paper. For background, see Kadison and
Ringrose (1997); Bratteli and Robinson (1987); Landsman (2017).
4See, e.g., Arageorgis (1995); Lupher (2008); Ruetsche (2011).
5See also Rieffel (1994); Landsman (1998, 2006, 2017). My presentation follows that of Binz et al. (2004b).
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3. For each f ∈ C([0, 1]) and each K ∈ K, the map [h 7→ f(h)K(h)] is in K.
Those familiar with fiber bundles should recognize some concepts here. The topological
space [0, 1] can be understood as a base space, with the fiber Ah above h ∈ [0, 1]. Contin-
uous sections are sections of the resulting bundle with the additional (pointwise) algebraic
structure induced by the structure of the fibers. The classical limit has further structure:
Definition 2. A continuous quantization ((Ah)h∈[0,1],K,Q) of the (complex) Poisson al-
gebra (P , {·, ·}) consists in a continuous field of C*-algebras ((Ah)h∈[0,1],K) and a linear,
*-preserving map Q : P → K such that the maps Qh : P → Ah defined for each h ∈ [0, 1] by
Qh(A) := Q(A)(h)
for all A ∈ P satisfy:
(Dirac’s Condition) The h-scaled commutator, defined for X, Y ∈ Ah by
[X, Y ]h :=
i
h
(XY − Y X), approaches the Poisson bracket in norm as h→ 0:
lim
h→0
‖[Qh(A),Qh(B)]h −Qh({A,B})‖h = 0.
The map Qh : P → Ah is called the quantization map for the value h ∈ [0, 1] of Planck’s
constant. Dirac’s Condition enforces the canonical commutation relations as they arise
from the classical Poisson bracket in the limit. Specifying a quantization map uniquely
determines a collection of continuous sections that “glues” a family of C*-algebras together
into a continuous field (Landsman, 1998, Thm. 1.2.4, p. 111).
The structure (Ah,Qh)h∈[0,1] is also called a strict quantization of (P , {·, ·}), the name
“strict” signifying that h is a number rather than a formal parameter.6 A strict quantization
is called a strict deformation quantization if Qh is injective for each h ∈ [0, 1] and Qh[P ] is
closed under the product in Ah.
It follows from the definition of a continuous quantization (see Landsman, 1998, §II.1)
that for all A,B ∈ P :
(i) (von Neumann’s condition) limh→0‖Qh(A)Qh(B)−Q(AB)‖h = 0;
(ii) (Rieffel’s condition) the map h 7→ ‖Qh(A)‖h is continuous.
From Dirac’s, von Neumann’s, and Rieffel’s conditions, it follows that the algebraic relations
between Qh(A) and Qh(B) approximate those between A and B in the sense that for any
 > 0, there is an h′ ∈ (0, 1] such that
|‖Qh(A)‖h − ‖A‖0| < 
‖Qh(A)Qh(B)−Qh(AB)‖h < 
‖[Qh(A),Qh(B)]−Qh({A,B})‖h < 
(1)
6There are other approaches to the classical limit including “formal deformation quantization” (Wald-
mann, 2015) and “geometric quantization” (see references in Landsman, 2006).
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for all h < h′. This sense of approximation will be important later on, and so I will return
to the physical interpretation of these inequalities in §4.
In preparation for the next section, I specify a notion of equivalence that allows one to
compare strict quantizations constructed with seemingly different interpretive motivations.
I will say that two strict quantizations (
1
Ah,
1
Qh)h∈[0,1] and (
2
Ah,
2
Qh)h∈[0,1] of (P , {·, ·}) are
equivalent just in case for each h ∈ [0, 1], there is a *-isomorphism αh :
1
Ah →
2
Ah such that
the following diagram commutes:7
P
1
Qh
  
2
Qh
1
Ah oo
αh //
2
Ah
Two strict quantizations are equivalent when the fibers Ah over each point h ∈ [0, 1] are
*-isomorphic, in a way that allows one to identify the continuous sections of each continuous
field. If one believes *-isomorphic C*-algebras have the capacity to represent the same
physical systems, then it follows that equivalent continuous quantizations have the capacity
to represent the classical limits for the same systems.
Later, I will construct two strict quantizations with conceptually distinct motivations.
One quantization allows us to interpret varying values of ~ as corresponding to different
worlds with different physics—this is the interpretation I take Rosaler and others to balk at.
The other quantization allows us to interpret varying values of ~ as representing the same
physical world in different systems of units—this is the interpretation I hope to show can
be used to explain classical behavior. However, I shall demonstrate that the resulting two
strict quantizations are equivalent, thus allowing us to transfer my preferred interpretation
to the mathematical structure in any of its equivalent instantiations.
It is worth making two remarks concerning the status of my definition of equivalent
quantizations. First, the significance of equivalence of quantizations relies on the substan-
tive assumption stated above: that *-isomorphic C*-algebras have the capacity to represent
the same physical systems. This view about the use of mathematical models, mathematical
equivalences, and representational capacities has been expressed in general terms elsewhere
(Feintzeig, 2015; Weatherall, 2016; Fletcher, 2018a). Although the stated claim is contro-
versial, I will simply take it on as an assumption without further argument and set the issue
aside for present purposes.8 One can understand my conclusions that rely on this assump-
tion to be conditional upon its acceptance. Yet, I also hope the spoils of this investigation
provide some reason for making the assumption in the first place.
Second, my main conclusion that one can use the classical limit to explain classical be-
havior from quantum mechanics does not rely on the aforementioned assumption about the
connection between equivalence and representational capacities. To establish this conclusion,
7This definition of equivalence is different than that given in Landsman (1998, p. 109), who considers
continuous fields of C*-algebras with identical fibers that agree asymptotically. I drop the condition that
the fibers are identical and instead only require them to be *-isomorphic; however, the notion of equivalence
here requires more than just asymptotic agreement.
8This assumption about *-isomorphisms in particular is natural for an algebraic imperialist, but not
necessarily for a Hilbert space conservative (in the sense of Ruetsche (2011)).
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I only need to show that there is some continuous quantization that can be given an inter-
pretation suitable for the explanation of classical behavior. I believe this can be done using
only the second continuous quantization I will define below, which I call the “factual limit”.
I believe it is illustrative to show that my preferred quantization is equivalent to a more stan-
dard formulation of the classical limit, whose interpretation has been deemed problematic.
The mathematical equivalence I will demonstrate between these two quantizations is meant
to aid our understanding of the new interpretation I provide. However, the equivalence is
not necessary for my argument that one can give a partial explanation of classical behavior,
and so for the main thesis of the paper one need not accept the (perhaps controversial) as-
sumption about isomorphisms and representational capacities that motivates my definition
of equivalent quantizations.
3.2 Example: the Weyl algebra
I now define a particular C*-algebra, known as the Weyl algebra that is often used to rep-
resent certain quantum systems (See Petz, 1990; Clifton and Halvorson, 2001).9 I will use
this example to illustrate the concept of a strict deformation quantization. I will then draw
upon this example in §4 when interpreting the classical limit with a precise notion of “ap-
proximation on certain scales.”
Start with a classical theory of a system with finitely many degrees of freedom and phase
space given by R2n. Such a system might consist of a finite number n of particles, each
moving in one-dimension. Each point x = (q1, ..., qn, p1, ..., pn) ∈ R2n, understood in some
canonical coordinate system, lists the position qj and momentum pj of each of the n particles.
Physical magnitudes of this system can be represented as complex-valued functions on
phase space f : R2n → C. Consider the family of functions W0(x) : R2n → C for each
x ∈ R2n defined by
W0(x)(y) := e
ix·y (2)
where · is the standard inner product on R2n. The classical Weyl algebra, denoted W0, is
defined as the C*-algebra containing all norm limits of polynomials of functions of the form
W0(x) for x ∈ R2n, endowed with the algebraic structure of pointwise addition, multiplica-
tion, and complex conjugation, and with the standard supremum norm.10
One constructs the quantum Weyl algebra by starting from the same generating mag-
nitudes W0(x) and deforming the commutative pointwise multiplication relation to obtain
a non-commutative algebra. I denote by Wh(x) the element W0(x) understood now as an
element of the quantum Weyl algebra. Define the non-commutative product on the quantum
Weyl algebra by
Wh(x)Wh(y) := e
ih
2
σ(x,y)Wh(x+ y) (3)
for all x, y ∈ R2n. Here σ is the standard symplectic form on R2n:
σ((q, p), (q′, p′)) := q′ · p− q · p′ (4)
9Feintzeig (2018b,a), Feintzeig et al. (2019), and Feintzeig and Weatherall (2019) argue against the use
of the Weyl algebra for representing quantum systems. However, the claims of the current paper can be
recovered with algebras favored by those authors.
10This C*-algebra W0 is known as the algebra of almost periodic functions on R2n (Binz et al., 2004a).
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for q, p, q′, p′ ∈ Rn, where · in the above expression is now the standard inner product on Rn.
The quantum Weyl algebra Wh is the C*-algebra obtained as the completion of the collection
of all polynomials (now with respect to the non-commutative multiplication operation) of
magnitudes of the form Wh(x) for x ∈ R2n in the so-called minimal regular norm (Manuceau
et al., 1974; Binz et al., 2004a,b). The relation in Eq. (3) is known as the Weyl form of the
canonical commutation relations because when the generators take their intended forms
Wh(a, b) ∼ ei(a·Q+b·P ) (5)
for the quantum position operator Q and momentum operator P (as in the Schro¨dinger
representation), Eq. (3) is equivalent to the familiar relation
[Q,P ] = i~. (6)
One can use these algebraic tools to construct a strict deformation quantization, which
can be used to represent the classical limit of the quantum systems represented by the Weyl
algebra. Binz et al. (2004b) show that there is a Poisson algebra (P , {·, ·}), norm dense inW0,
containing all “suitably smooth” magnitudes. Here, {·, ·} is just the usual Poisson bracket
determined by the standard symplectic form σ. The quantization maps Qh : P → Wh for
each h ∈ [0, 1] are defined as the linear extension of
Qh(W0(x)) := Wh(x) (7)
for all x ∈ R2n. With the quantization maps so defined, the family (Wh,Qh)h∈[0,1] is a strict
deformation quantization. Furthermore, one can define a collection of continuous sections
K as the smallest C*-subalgebra of ∏h∈[0,1]Ah containing the maps [h 7→ Qh(A)] for each
A ∈ P . Then with the global quantization map Q : P → K defined by
Q(A)(h) := Qh(A)
for all A ∈ P , the structure ((Wh)h∈[0,1],K,Q) becomes a continuous quantization. Thus,
one can encode the classical limit of a quantum system represented by the Weyl algebra in a
continuous field of C*-algebras. I will spell out in more detail in §4 how one can interpret the
mathematical structure specified by this continuous field of algebras as I use this example
to illustrate the notion of “approximation on certain scales” at play in the classical limit.
4 A notion of approximation
Now that we have some familiarity with continuous quantizations, it is the purpose of this
section to interpret the mathematical tools they provide. Specifically, in this section I will
argue that continuous quantizations provide tools for interpreting the classical limit of quan-
tum theories through a notion of “approximation on certain scales”. I argue that the spectral
theorem, which already plays a central role in the interpretation of quantum theories, is also
essential to this notion of approximation.
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4.1 The Spectral Theorem and Numerical Values
The main idea of my interpretation of continuous quantizations is that a quantization map
can be interpreted as identifying operators that represent the same physical quantity in
different systems of units. This interpretation is possible because we can identify projection
operators as providing theoretical content that is independent of a system of units, and the
spectral theorem shows how general quantities are related to projections. My first task in
the current section is to make this interpretation of projections and the spectral theorem
precise before proceeding to their interplay with quantization maps.
To begin, recall that while a general self-adjoint operator A ∈ A can be used to represent
a real-valued physical magnitude, one can say more about the representational capacities of
a projection E. Projections are capable of representing propositions. Since sp(E) = {0, 1},
one can think of the two possible values of E as true (1) and false (0). The usual rules for
calculating the expectation value of a projection give the probability that the proposition
represented by E is true (a number in [0, 1]), which agrees with the Born rule for calculating
the probabilities of outcomes for magnitudes represented by self-adjoint operators (see also
Scheibe, 1973, Ch. II-III).
I claim that one can interpret general self-adjoint operators as differing from projections
in the following sense: while the values of the physical magnitudes represented by general self-
adjoint operators almost always vary in different systems of units, the values of a proposition
represented by a projection stay the same. Suppose, for example, that A is a self-adjoint
operator representing a position magnitude for a particle.11 Then changing units of distance
from m to cm changes the possible values the magnitude represented by A can take on,
scaling the numerical values by 100, e.g., 4m 7→ 400cm. On the other hand, suppose EO is a
projection representing the proposition “The particle is located in the region represented by
O”. If the particle is located in the region represented by O, then the proposition represented
by EO is true and takes the value 1, whereas if the particle is outside of the region represented
by O, then the proposition represented by EO is false and takes the value 0. These values are
unitless : the particle is either in the region represented by O or not, regardless of whether
we refer to O in units of m or cm.
On this interpretation, it follows that while one can hold fixed the projection operator
used to represent a given proposition, one may need to use different self-adjoint operators to
represent the same physical magnitude in different systems of units. In the previous example,
while we can use EO to represent the given proposition in any system of units, if we use A to
represent the position magnitude in units of m, then we will need to use some other operator,
whose numerical values are scaled by 100, to represent the same position magnitude in units
of cm. The spectral theorem informs us as to which self-adjoint operator we should use to
represent the same physical magnitude in a different system of units.
Recall that the spectral theorem12 states that for every physical magnitude represented
by a self-adjoint element A of a C*-algebra A, there is a projection valued measure E :
11A C*-algebra will contain only bounded operators capable of representing only bounded physical quanti-
ties, and hence will not contain a position operator, generally. Additional complications arise for unbounded
operators affiliated with a C*-algebra, which I ignore because one also has a spectral theorem for unbounded
self-adjoint operators (Kadison and Ringrose, 1997, §5.6).
12See Reed and Simon (1980, Ch. VII) or Kadison and Ringrose (1997, §5.2).
13
B(sp(A))→ A∗∗ such that
A =
∫
sp(A)
λ dEλ (8)
where λ is understood as the identity function on sp(A). Here, B(sp(A)) is the Borel σ-
algebra of sp(A), and E takes values in the universal enveloping W*-algebra A∗∗ of A.
The spectral theorem tells us we can understand physical magnitudes as assigning nu-
merical values to associated propositions. For example, the position magnitude expressed
in units of m assigns to the proposition “The particle is 4m from the origin” the numerical
value 4. The numerical values that a magnitude assigns to each proposition are fixed by
the association of the projections with values λ ∈ sp(A) (or really a range of values for λ in
a Borel subset). The spectral theorem tells us this information—a collection of projections
and an association of them with numerical values—is sufficient to reconstruct the original
self-adjoint operator representing the physical magnitude in the given system of units.
The spectral theorem also informs us about which operator we should use to represent
the same physical magnitude in a different system of units. Generally, a physical magnitude
expressed in different systems of units will associate the same propositions with different
numerical values. For example, if one changes units from m to cm, the position magnitude
then assigns to the very same proposition “The particle is 4m from the origin” the new
numerical value 400. This is because the projection also represents the (identical) proposition
“The particle is 400cm from the origin.”
This is all the information we need to figure out which operator we should use to represent
the same physical magnitude in a new choice of units because it tells us to replace the identity
function λ in the integral expression of Eq. (8) with a different Borel function f : sp(A)→ C.
For example, in the unit change from m to cm, the function f is f(λ) = 100λ for all
λ ∈ sp(A). This new function f associated with the unit change can be thought of as either
reassigning the values of the physical magnitude new numerical values by rescaling them, or
equivalently as reassociating the spectral projections Eλ with new numerical values f(λ).
Knowing the new numerical values we want to associate with a physical magnitude, we
now know that we should use the operator
A′ :=
∫
sp(A)
f(λ)dEλ (9)
to represent the same physical magnitude we previously used A to represent, now considered
in the new system of units. To summarize, the interpretation I am advocating entails that
we can use the operators A and A′ = f(A) to represent the same physical magnitude in
different systems of units. In our example, while we use the operator A to represent the
position magnitude in units of m, we should now use A′ = f(A) = 100A to represent the
position magnitude in units of cm. Heuristically, we might say that the unit change induces
a “transformation” A 7→ f(A). All we mean by this, though, is that we should in general use
a different operator to represent the same physical magnitude when we work in a different
system of units.
The reason the foregoing is important is that a quantization map provides us with pre-
cisely the tools we need to explicitly identify which elements of an algebra represent the same
physical magnitude. In particular, if A ∈ A0 represents a physical magnitude in a classical
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theory, then we will understand Qh(A) to represent the same physical magnitude in a quan-
tum theory in units in which Planck’s constant takes on the numerical value h. Reflecting on
unit changes helps us see the relationship between Qh(A) and Qh′(A) for different numerical
values h, h′ of Planck’s constant. In other words, we will see that one can express Qh′(A) as
f(Qh(A)) for a function f : sp(Qh(A))→ C specifying a change of units.
In the next subsection, I will make the preceding remarks about quantization maps precise
using the interpretation outlined in this section. Note, however, that I am not claiming the
interpretation just offered of the relationship between self-adjoint operators and projections
is the only one available. An alternative interpretation in which projections “transform”
under unit changes may also be possible, but I will not consider it here. I have offered one
coherent and precise interpretation that will be helpful as we proceed; I only claim that one
can take this interpretation, but not that one is forced to. This is sufficient for my goal,
which is only to show that it is possible to give an interpretation in which the classical limit
can be used to explain the success of classical physics.
4.2 Units, Scales, and (Counter)Factual Limits
When interpreting limits of physical constants like ~→ 0, there are two different approaches
one can take. Following Fletcher (2018b) (who draws on Rohrlich (1989)), I will call these
the counterfactual and factual approaches13 to interpreting the classical limit.
Just as Gamow’s Mr. Tompkins dreams of a world in which macroscopic objects like
billiard balls display the strangeness of the quantum world (Gamow, 1993, Ch. 7), the
counterfactual approach attempts to answer the question, “How would the world be different
if Planck’s constant ~ were to take a different value?” The counterfactual interpretation
appears to answer questions only about other possibilities besides the actual world. On the
other hand, the factual approach attempts to answer the question, “In the actual world, how
do quantities behave in different systems of units in which Planck’s constant ~ takes different
values?” Thus, the two approaches differ on whether they are concerned with modeling
the actual world with the actual observations and experiments (factual interpretation) or
alternative physical possibilities (counterfactual interpretation).
It seems that only the factual interpretation can answer explanatory questions about ap-
proximate classical behavior in our world. So if one thought current mathematical resources
required a counterfactual interpretation, there would appear to be a conceptual gap. And
indeed, the passages quoted in §2 suggest that Nickles, Radder, and Rosaler have something
like a counterfactual interpretation in mind when they object to the explanatory power of
the ~→ 0 limit. In what follows, I will establish the viability and the significance of a factual
interpretation of the ~→ 0 limit. I take this factual interpretation to provide a response to
the preceding worries, and also to make precise the sense in which the ~→ 0 limit explains
the theoretical structure of classical mechanics. I begin by clarifying the counterfactual
interpretation so that we can use it for comparison.
13Fletcher (2018b) works out these approaches in the context of the Newtonian limit c → ∞ for general
relativity. Here, I adapt the analysis to quantum theories. Fletcher has changed his terminology since
the writing of the current paper from “(counter)factual” to “(counter)legal” to avoid confusions with other
associations of the term “counterfactual”.
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4.2.1 Counterfactual quantization
It is not hard to see how one would give a counterfactual interpretation of the continuous
quantization of the Weyl algebra specified at the end of §3. On this interpretation, one
represents a different “world” for each value of ~ by taking the physical quantities of the
system to form a distinct algebra
CF
A h = Wh. One can keep fixed the classical “world” in
which quantities are represented by elements of
CF
A 0 =W0. The counterfactual quantization
map
CF
Q h = Qh defined in Eq. (7) then identifies the “same” or “counterpart” magnitudes
in distinct worlds.
This indeed defines a strict and continuous deformation quantization (with counterfactual
continuous sections
CF
K = K), as discussed previously. And the apparatus so defined matches
the intuition of the counterfactual approach that each “world” can be interpreted as being
governed by distinct laws because each world realizes a different commutation relation:
Wh(x)Wh(y) = e
ih
2
σ(x,y)Wh(x+ y) (10)
for all x, y ∈ R2n. Thus, one can understand the “worlds” represented by the counterfactual
quantization to really be physically different. I think it is understandable that other authors
would balk at such a structure as useful for giving explanations in our own world. I agree
with the insinuations of Nickles, Radder, and Rosaler quoted in §2: the significance of the
counterfactual interpretation is opaque.
I will not attempt to show that facts about other possible worlds can be used to explain
facts about the actual world. Instead, I believe it is worthwhile to develop an alternative
factual interpretation. I will do so in the remainder of this section by defining an alternative
strict quantization that encodes varying values of ~ as representing the same world in different
systems of units. I will establish that this structure indeed forms a strict and continuous
deformation quantization by showing it is equivalent to the counterfactual quantization. If
one accepts my interpretation of equivalence from §3, then it follows that one could just as
well give a factual interpretation of the counterfactual quantization structure. But even if one
rejects my interpretation of equivalence, I will still have shown that a factual interpretation
of the ~→ 0 limit is possible, and it is this interpretation that I take to be explanatory.
4.2.2 Factual Quantization
On the factual approach, one wants to specify algebras
F
Ah that represent physical quantities
in the actual world and use the index h only to investigate how these quantities change in
different systems of units. Since one wants to model quantities in only the actual world, one
can start with the constraint that all of the algebras
F
Ah be identical. So let us fix our world
in units where h = 1 and define
F
Ah := W1 for all h ∈ (0, 1]. Of course, since one wants to
explain classical behavior, one still needs to let
F
A0 :=W0. One then uses a quantization map
to identify how each physical quantity changes in the actual world when one changes units so
that the numerical value of Planck’s constant changes as h′ 7→ h (for arbitrary h, h′ ∈ (0, 1]).
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In other words, we will proceed to define
F
Qh so that for each A ∈ P , Qh(A) represents the
same physical magnitude as A in the quantum theory expressed in a system of units in which
Planck’s constant ~ takes the numerical value h.
To think about these changes of units, let us start by analyzing the classical quantities. It
will be helpful to specify a canonical coordinate system (q1, ..., qn, p1, ..., pn) on the classical
phase space R2n and expand the operators W0(x), where x = (a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bn):
W0(a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bn)(q1, ..., qn, p1, ..., pn) = e
i(a1q1+...+anqn+b1p1+...+bnpn). (11)
For concreteness, suppose that the unit change that induces the change in the numerical
value of Planck’s constant h′ 7→ h is a change of distance units (e.g., cm to m).14 To
understand how this affects the numerical values of quantities involved, recall that Planck’s
constant has units [ (mass)·(distance)
2
time
], each position quantity qj has units [(distance)], and each
momentum quantity pj has units [
(mass)·(distance)
(time)
]. Since Planck’s constant involves units of
(distance)2, while position and momentum involve units only of (distance), if one changes
units of distance in a way that induces a change in numerical values h′ 7→ h, this will change
the numerical values of position and momentum by
qj 7→
√
h
h′
· qj
pj 7→
√
h
h′
· pj.
(*)
Now, let us shift focus to the magnitudes W1(a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bn) for the corresponding
quantum system. In this case, if one restricts attention to the (regular) Schro¨dinger repre-
sentation (pi, L2(Rn)) of the Weyl algebra,15 then the Weyl unitaries take the form (cf. Eq.
(5):
pi(W1(a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bn)) = e
i(a1Q1+...+anQn+b1P1+...+bnPn) (12)
for self-adjoint unbounded operators Q1, ..., Qn, P1, ..., Pn representing the quantized position
and momentum magnitudes. Although generally Qj and Pj will not belong to any C*-algebra
F
Ah because they are unbounded, one may restrict attention to the Schro¨dinger representation
in which the spectral theorem still applies.
So suppose Qj is a position magnitude affiliated with the quantum system. Let E denote
the projection valued measure in the Schro¨dinger representation associated with Qj:
Qj =
∫
sp(Qj)
λ dEλ. (13)
14One can in an exactly analogous way define equivalent factual continuous quantizations for mass and
time unit changes.
15See Feintzeig (2017, 2018b,a); Feintzeig et al. (2019); Feintzeig and Weatherall (2019) for reasons to
focus on regular representations of the Weyl algebra, of which the Stone-von Neumann theorem tells us the
Schro¨dinger representation is the unique irreducible one.
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On the interpretation of projections and self-adjoint operators outlined above, a unit change
that induces the change in numerical values of Planck’s constant h′ 7→ h leaves each pro-
jection E fixed but changes the values that Qj associates to E according to the scale factor√
h
h′ as per Eq. (*). This yields a change
Qj 7→ Q′j =
∫
sp(Qj)
√
h
h′
· λ dEλ =
√
h
h′
·Qj. (14)
Similarly, suppose Pj is a momentum magnitude affiliated with the quantum system, under-
stood as the standard momentum operator in the Schro¨dinger representation of the Weyl
algebra associated with projection valued measure F :
Pj =
∫
sp(Pj)
λ dFλ. (15)
Again, a change of units that induces the change in numerical values of Planck’s constant
h′ 7→ h leaves each projection F fixed but changes the values that Pj associates to F according
to the scale factor
√
h
h′ as per Eq. (*). This yields a change
Pj 7→ P ′j =
∫
sp(Pj)
√
h
h′
· λ dFλ =
√
h
h′
· Pj. (16)
Now, let us use this change of units to define the factual quantization map
F
Qh : P →
F
Ah.
First, we can simplify our expressions by recalling that we wish to model changing units
from
F
Ah′ =W1 in which the numerical value of Planck’s constant is ~ = h′ = 1. So this unit
change induces the change in numerical values 1 7→ h with scaling factor
√
h
h′ =
√
h. This
motivates defining the factual quantization map as the linear continuous extension of
F
Qh(W0(a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bn)) := W1(
√
h · a1, ...,
√
h · an,
√
h · b1, ...,
√
h · bn) (17)
for all (a1, ..., an, b1, ..., bn) ∈ R2n. This appears in the Schro¨dinger representation as
pi(W1(
√
h · a1, ...,
√
h · an,
√
h · b1, ...,
√
h · bn)) = ei(a1
√
h·Q1+...+an
√
h·Qn+b1
√
h·P1+...+bn
√
h·Pn)
(18)
with each Qj and Pj scaled by the factor
√
h as desired. More succinctly, one can write
F
Qh(W0(x)) = W1(
√
h · x) (19)
for all x ∈ R2n.
Notice that the operators W1(x) for x ∈ R2n obey the standard commutation relation
W1(x)W1(y) = e
i
2
σ(x,y)W1(x+ y) (20)
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for all x, y ∈ R2n. This relation remains fixed in each of the algebras
F
Ah = W1, indicating
that the physical laws remain the same in the one “world” we represent.
With this factual quantization map, one can follow the procedure of §3.2 to construct
a continuous quantization ((
F
Ah)h∈[0,1],
F
K,
F
Q). Define the collection of factual continuous
sections
F
K as the smallest C*-subalgebra of ∏h∈[0,1] FAh containing the maps [h 7→ FQh(A)]
for all A ∈ P . Define the factual global quantization map
F
Q : P →
F
K by
F
Q(A)(h) :=
F
Qh(A)
This structure provides a continuous quantization of P , as I establish next by showing it is
equivalent to the counterfactual quantization.16
4.2.3 Factual Interpretation
Now that we have constructed two mathematical structures with quite different motivations—
the counterfactual quantization for alternative possible worlds and the factual quantization
for our world —I will establish that both mathematical structures have the same represen-
tational capacities. That is, I will show that the counterfactual ((
CF
A h)h∈[0,1],
CF
K ,
CF
Q ) and the
factual ((
F
Ah)h∈(0,1],
F
K,
F
Q) continuous quantizations are equivalent.
For each h ∈ (0, 1], define αh :
CF
A h 7→
F
Ah as the unique linear, norm continuous extension
of17
αh(Wh(x)) := W1(
√
h · x) (21)
It suffices to notice that
W1(
√
h · x)) ·W1(
√
h · y) = e ih2 σ(x,y)W1(
√
h(x+ y)) (22)
for all x, y ∈ R2n due to the fact that σ(√h · x,√h · y) = h · σ(x, y). This establishes that
αh is a *-isomorphism for each h ∈ (0, 1] and, by construction,
αh ◦
CF
Qh =
F
Qh (23)
Hence, the two quantizations are equivalent.
This establishes that the factual quantization defined above is indeed a continuous quan-
tization. Furthermore, this shows that even the counterfactual quantization, i.e., the quan-
tization presented in §4.2.1, can be interpreted as showing that classical kinematics holds
in our world “approximately on certain scales”. That is, one can import the notion of
16I leave it as an exercise to the reader to use the material of §4.2.2 to relate Weyl unitaries for different
values of h in the form
F
Qh′(W0(x)) = f(
F
Qh(W0(x))) for some Borel function f : sp(Qh(W0(x))) → C, as
promised in §4.1.
17We can take α0 to be the identity on
CF
A 0 =
F
A0.
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“approximation on certain scales” from the factual quantization to either of these mathe-
matical structures. So what is the notion of “approximation on certain scales” in the factual
quantization?
In the factual continuous quantization, suppose we are given arbitrary classical quantities
A,B ∈ P and a chosen numerical error bound  > 0. It now follows from Eq. (1), repeated
below for emphasis, that there is a choice of units (i.e., some combination of distance, time,
and mass units) in which Planck’s constant ~ takes on a numerical value h such that in this
system of units the behavior of Qh(A) and Qh(B) is “within ” of the behavior of A and B:
|‖Qh(A)‖h − ‖A‖0| < 
‖Qh(A)Qh(B)−Qh(AB)‖h < 
‖[Qh(A),Qh(B)]−Qh({A,B})‖h < 
(24)
Similarly, for every h′ < h, the inequalities (24) will hold with h replaced by h′. Notice
further that this implies that for any state ω on Ah,
|ω(Qh(A)Qh(B))− ω(Qh(AB))| < 
|ω([Qh(A),Qh(B)])− ω(Qh({A,B}))| < 
(25)
and so the expectation values of relevant physical quantities are within  of one another.
Thus, Qh(A) and Qh(B) approximate A and B at all “scales” above the one defined by the
value of the error bound  and the system of units in which Planck’s constant ~ takes the
numerical value h.
The notion of “scale” here has a particular precise meaning. It corresponds to the physical
size of the interval that the number  determines. The very same numerical error bound 
determines a physically larger or smaller interval as we change units. This is because the
same number, when viewed in different systems of units, may represent a larger or smaller
physical quantity. It follows from the inequalities in Eq. (25) that even when the numerical
(expectation) values of the physical magnitudes Qh(A)Qh(B) and Qh(AB) differ wildly in
one choice of units, they will be close together in another. Thus we recover the intuitive
notion that as ~→ 0, we “zoom out” from the quantum system by caring less and less about
the microscopic details. The way one coarse-grains from the microscopic details is by fixing
a numerical error bound  and changing units so that  represents a physically larger interval
of allowable error. The typical interpretation is that experiments probe the system on larger
“scales” because qualitative precision decreases as allowable error increases.
Notice that the spectral theorem plays a crucial role in this interpretation. In order to
understand the ~ → 0 limit under this notion of “approximation at certain scales”, one
understands a change in the numerical value h to correspond to a change of units. This can
be accomplished precisely because one has spectral projections for each physical magnitude,
which are held fixed even as units change. Thus, the spectral projections and the relations
among them represent the “invariant” (under unit changes) physical content of the theory.
It is worth stressing that on the current interpretation, a choice of units on its own does
not define a scale. Instead, a scale is determined by both the numerical value of the error
bound  and the units in which it is expressed. This means that a scale is not set by the
system being measured, but rather by the measurement procedure one uses to probe the
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system. One might object that this is not the notion of “scale” used colloquially in the
physics community. I do not claim that this is the only notion of scale used by physicists,
but I do believe it is one that has been employed to understand the classical limit (e.g.,
see Emch (1983, p. 418)), and I believe this notion of scale helps make precise a way of
understanding the classical limit that is conceptually significant.18 I am optimistic that this
notion of scale is analogous to, or helpful for, making sense of scales and coarse graining in
other contexts like renormalization theory because it seems that particle physicists often have
something like this notion of scale in mind.19 My optimism may be unfounded, but I believe
the interpretation just given is important in its own right regardless of future applications.
One might still worry about the notion of approximation I’ve just laid out. We are never
in the position of specifying our tolerable error as a unitless number ; the error tolerated
by a measuring apparatus is typically specified in the units in which our apparatus displays
measured values. But the analysis just given can be adapted immediately to this situation,
as follows. To fix the units in which the error bound is expressed, one first needs to fix  > 0
(say, fix  = 1). The facts captured in Eqs. (24) and (25) tell us that there is some system of
units in which ~ takes the value h ∈ (0, 1] and in this system of units the number  provides
a tolerable bound. Now, comparing one’s preferred choice of units (e.g., natural units with
~ = 1) to the choice of units that yields the value h for Planck’s constant provides a way
of converting the error  from the system of units defined by ~ = h to the system of units
defined by ~ = 1. The necessary unit change here will depend on the physical dimensions
of the magnitudes considered, which align with the dimensions of . The important result
is that if we fix a system of units, there exists an error bound (the number , re-expressed
in preferred units) such that the difference of values of the relevant physical quantities lies
within that error bound.
This notion of approximation is both weaker and stronger than one might like. It is
weaker because one cannot arbitrarily choose both the error bound  and the units in which
it is expressed. If one fixes the number , then we know there exists a system of units for
 in which the approximation in Eqs. (24) and (25) holds, but this may not agree with the
units we prefer. On the other hand, if one fixes a system of units, then the value of the
error bound will be determined by the existence of the unit transformation to be applied to
, which again may not yield the error bound we prefer. This makes sense because classical
and quantum mechanics make different predictions; one cannot be expected to make them
coincide unless one is willing to lose precision in measurements.
On the other hand, the notion of approximation is also quite strong. For given physical
magnitudes, the number  provides a uniform bound on the tolerable error for expectation
values of the magnitudes in all states. This is important because if one only considered one
state at a time, it would be no surprise that one could make quantum expectation values
close to classical expectation values by accepting a large enough error. What is surprising
and significant is that there is a single notion of closeness, or a single error bound, that makes
18For further remarks on error bounds in reductive explanations, see Scheibe (1986) or the discussion of
“limits of validity” in Rohrlich (1990, 2002).
19Recent philosophical work on renormalization describes theories related by renormalization group trans-
formations as “alternative descriptions of the same physical system” (Fraser, 2019, p. 22). See also similar
remarks in Rosaler and Harlander (2019).
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the expectation values of all states close enough.20 This is what allows us to interpret the
approximation as explaining the theoretical structure of classical mechanics. The uniform
approximation of the norm and product explains the spectral properties of each magnitude,
i.e. why it has a certain range of possible values. The uniform approximation of Poisson
brackets by commutators explains why magnitudes have certain theoretical relations to each
other that are encoded in the geometry of the classical phase space. It is the approximation
of theoretical properties and relations of kinematical quantities that allows us to explain the
theoretical structure of classical mechanics from quantum mechanics.
5 Discussion
I have now shown a sense in which the classical limit, when given a factual interpretation, can
be used to explain the theoretical structure of classical mechanics from quantum mechanics.
This explanation proceeds by establishing that in our world, the properties and relations
of quantum magnitudes are “close” to the properties and relations of classical magnitudes.
Here, “close” means that there is a uniform error bound for the difference between the pre-
dictions given by the quantum and classical expectation values; this error bound is uniform
in the sense that it provides a single bound for all possible states. Mathematically, this error
bound is encoded in a numerical value  and a choice of units specified by the numerical
value of Planck’s constant. It is the choice of units that varies as ~→ 0, and together with
the number  determines a “scale” for probing the system.
My analysis here agrees with Rosaler (2015a) that empirical information is needed to
determine the appropriate error bound for a given situation or experiment (See also the
discussion of context in Primas (1998)). The classical limit does not guarantee that use of
classical mechanics will suffice for arbitrary levels of precision, and so it may not suffice for
a given empirical situation. On the other hand, the classical limit entails the existence of
some level of precision on which one can apply the structure of classical mechanics, if one
allows for a large enough error bound.
My analysis differs from Rosaler’s in that I only explain the kinematical structure of clas-
sical mechanics. I have completely ignored dynamics, which is Rosaler’s central concern and
perhaps the reason he approaches the problem through decoherence theory. This difference
is not a disagreement; it shows that our concerns are orthogonal in one respect. I believe
results from Landsman (1998, §II.2.7) may serve to extend the interpretation offered here to
dynamical structure. But I also believe the treatment of dynamics and decoherence Rosaler
offers is important and complementary to my approach.
My position also differs from Rosaler’s in a further substantive way. Rosaler only explains
the success of the empirical predictions of classical mechanics, while I claim that one can go
further and explain its theoretical structure. In this way, I also disagree with Radder (1991),
and I provide at least one example of a reductive explanation along the lines of what is
advocated for by Post (1971). Whereas Rosaler’s results are restricted to approximations for
expectation values of individual states as in Eq. (25), I claim that the approximations cap-
tured by Eq. (24) are of central importance. Only these uniform approximations of products
and commutators can serve to explain the spectral structure of classical quantities, which
20Cf. Primas (1998, p. 95) for a contrasting claim that a uniform approximation is not possible.
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encodes their possible values, and their Poisson structure, which encodes their geometrical
relations.21
Finally, I take my interpretation to be compatible with the common understanding of
the ~ → 0 limit that treats the parameter ~ as a “dimensionless ratio”. Recall that this
interpretation is advocated for by Batterman (2002, p. 99, fn. 1) and also by Landsman
(2017, p. 247). I believe the dimensionless ratio interpretation especially helps us understand
the classical limits of quantum states (or continuous fields of states) because particular states
can determine the values of quantities like temperature, length, or momentum that one needs
to compare to ~ to construct the appropriate dimensionless ratio. My explanation of the
kinematical structure of classical mechanics does not depend on such a choice of a continuous
field of states. But this should not suggest that my dimensionful interpretation of the classical
limit is in conflict with the dimensionless ratio interpretation.
On my view, it would be all the better if there were multiple ways of interpreting the
mathematical structures used to model the classical limit. I only claim the interpretation
given above in terms of “approximation on certain scales” is one possibility. This interpreta-
tion is useful for capturing the explanatory utility of the classical limit, although it may not
be the only interpretation or the best one for all purposes. I have argued that the classical
~ → 0 limit, understood in terms of continuous fields of C*-algebras, gives rise to one way
of explaining the success of the kinematical framework of classical mechanics; I believe this
explanation deserves both recognition and philosophical attention.
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